Michigan Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 7

1966

Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale
Robert L. Jordan
University of California, Los Angeles

William D. Warren
University of California, Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Law
and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285
(1966).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss7/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES:
A RATIONALE
Robert L. J.ordan and William D. Warren*
~

OR the better part of the past decade much of the energy of those
interested in consumer credit legislation has been expended in
debating the problem of fair disclosure of finance charges. While
those who have studied the subject concede that full disclosure of
finance charges does not offer a solution to some of the most basic
problems besetting the credit consumer today, the issue of fair disclosure of finance charges has still become a rallying point for consumers and a battle line for industry. Consumers demand the right
to be told what they are paying for credit in terms that they can
understand. Industry disclaims the motive of wishing to conceal the
amount of finance charges and asserts that its principal activity
should be selling credit, not calculating finance charges. To most
consumer representatives, full disclosure means time rate disclosure.
To some industry representatives, the requirement of time rate dis. closure in every transaction is totally infeasible.
One wonders whether in all of the talk generated about disclo- ·
sure in the past few years the purposes of disclosing finance charges
to consumers have not been somewhat obscured. This article is an
attempt to examine the subject of disclosure from the standpoint of
the function it performs in consumer credit transactions. We shall
discuss the various methods of computing finance charges in the different segments of the finance industry, the functions of disclosure
of finance charges and the feasibility of using different computational methods in each category of consumer transactions. The problems involved in _requiring the disclosure of finance charges are not
as simple as one is sometimes led to believe. Each side of the controversy has good arguments to support its view; neither side is the
exclusive repository of justice and morality. The problem of required disclosure has long been debated and is ripe for resolution.

F

• The authors are Professors of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles.
They have served since 1964 as Reporters-Draftsmen of the Consumer Credit Project
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The opinions
expressed in this article are their own and are not intended to reflect the views of the
National Conference or of the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury.-Ed.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Professor Robert W. Johnson,
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, not only for advising them on the mathematical aspects of disclosure of finance charges, but also
for assisting them in· clarifying their thinking in the whole area of disclosure.
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It is our hope that this article will succeed in pointing out some of
the factors that should be considered in a compromise legislative
solution of this thorny problem. 1

I.

USE OF COMPUTATIONAL METHODS IN DIFFERENT
SEGMENTS OF THE FINANCE INDUSTRY

One generally tends to identify certain methods of computation
with particular segments of the finance industry. A credit union will
normally quote a finance charge in terms of a fixe~ per cent per
month on the unpaid balance of the debt. Many small-loan companies are required by law to calculate and quote the finance charge
as a graduated monthly rate, for example three per cent on the first
$100, two per cent on the next $400 and one per cent on the debt
in excess of $500. Sales finance companies normally give the consumer a statement of the dollar amount of the finance charge, but
may advertise their charges as a rate expressed as so many dollars for
each $100 of the original debt for each year the debt is outstanding.
Commercial ,banks usually express their finance charges as an annual
percentage interest rate but discount the loan, that is, deduct the
interest charge from the amount loaned.
I. Small loan transactions. Per cent per month on the declining
balance was adopted by statute as the method of computation applicable to the legitimate small loans industry at the time of its birth
and early growth under the leadership of the Russell Sage Foundation. This method had previously been adopted by the borroweroriented credit unions, and was deemed to be most fair to borrowers
because finance charges were computed each month and were based
solely upon the loan balance outstanding at that time. 2 In addition,
I. By way of a scope note, it should be made clear that the objectivo of this article
is to discuss whether time rate disclosure of finance charges in consumer transactions
is desirable, and, if so, in what kinds of transactions it is appropriate. There arc other
substantial problems in the area of disclosure of finance charges that we have not
attempted to treat in this article. Among these are: (1) how is a consumer transaction
defined? (2) How is a finance charge defined? Should it include other charges incident
to the granting of the credit, such as credit life insurance and credit accident and
health insurance? (3) At what point of time should disclosure of finance charges be
made, pre-contract or post-contract? What bearing should the nature of the transaction (telephone sale, catalogue sale, add-on sale, consumer letter of credit loan) have
on this question? (4) What disclosure requirements should be made for such re•
financing transactions as "rewrites" and extensions? (5) How can finance charges be
disclosed in lease transactions that perform the same function as sales?
2. Under the per cent per month method, the finance charge is computed monthly
. by multiplying the outstanding balance of the credit by a monthly percentage rate,
For example, assume that a loan of $120 is made on the first day of the month and
the monthly rate is 2%, On the first day of the next month, the finance charge for
the first month is calculated by multiplying 2% by $120, or $2.40. If the statute is
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the finance charge was all-inclusive; no other charges could be
made.3
The supposed advantages to the borrower of the per cent per
month on declining balance method notwithstanding, there has been
a pronounced shift toward precomputation in the small loans indusbased on a thirty-day month, the charge will vary with the length of the month. In
the previous example, if the first day of the next month came thirty-one days later,
the finance charge would be 2% X 31/30 X $120. At the end of each month, the
borrower not only must pay the finance charge but also must make payments to
reduce the principle. For example, the contract might require that the principal be
repaid at the rate of $10 per month for twelve months. On this basis, the payment
due at the end of the first month is $12.40 ($10 principal plus $2.40 finance, charge).
The payments due at the end of the succeeding eleven months will be progressively
less because the monthly finance charge is calculated on the basis of outstanding
principal, which is constantly being reduced. Thus, the finance charge for the second
month would be $110 x 2%, or $2.20, and for the third month, $100 x 2%, or
$2.00. Monthly payments are thus unequal in amount. However, credit suppliers may
adopt a procedure whereby the monthly payment is a constant amount which will
pay off the principal and finance charges in one year. This, in fact, is the most
commonly used method. Here, the proportion of the monthly payment allocable to
finance charge and principal will vary from month to month. The amount applicable
to finance charge will decrease and the amount applicable to payment on principal
will increase in successive months. By use of annuity tables we can calculate that,
with respect to our example, an even payment of $11.35 per month will amortize
the loan in twelve months. See generally MoRS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES:
RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION 15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Moas].
The per cent per month method has certain advantages. It makes it unnecessary
to make any adjustment for late payments or for prepayments. The debtor pays a
finance charge only for the actual number of days the principal is outstanding. In the
case of the unequal monthly payment system, if the monthly payment is made early
the finance charge will be less. If the payment is made late, the finance charge will
be greater. In the case of the equal monthly payment system, the proportion of the
monthly payment allocable to the finance charge will be less if the payment is made
early and greater if the payment is made late. If there have been adjustments in
allocation because of early or late payments over the life of the credit where the
equal payment method is employed, the amount of the last payment will be equal
to the sum of unpaid principal and outstanding finance charges, and therefore may
be less or greater than previous payments. However, the practice of the creditor will
often provide that no adjustment of the amounts allocated to principal and interest
will be made for early or late payments within stated limits. Under the per cent per
month method the dollar amount of finance charges which the debtor will have to
pay over the life of the credit can be calculated at the time the credit is advanced
only if it is assumed that all payments will be made exactly on schedule. This calculation will be inaccurate to the extent that there are any late or early payments.
See JOHNSON, METIIODS OF STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES 30-31 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as JOHNSON].
3. The seventh draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law, 1942, provides: "Section 13.
(a) Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on any loan of money not
exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent a month on
that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan not in excess of $100, and 2
per cent a month on any remainder of such unpaid principal balance.... (c) In addition to the charges herein provided for, no further or other amount whatsover shall
be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received." See CuRRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 144, 152-53 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CURRAN]. Miss
Curran's book is an excellent compilation of the consumer credit laws and will be
utilized throughout this article as the authoritative statement of existing laws.
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try in the past fifteen years.4 Precomputation has become popular for
two reasons. First, lenders maintain that it allows simplification of
operations. Under the per cent per month on declining balance system, each payment must be prorated to finance charge and principal
by a clerk. Under precomputation, the clerk need ordinarily make
no calculation at the time he receives the installment. Late payments
are handled by means of a penalty charge. Only in the case of a prepayment must any calculation be made. Second, precomputation
normally provides the lender with a larger return where a borrower
prepays or refinances than does the per cent per month on declining
balance method. 5 If the rate is graduated, the finance charge for the
early portion of the contract is made up of a higher proportion of
low rate charge than is true of the finance charge for the contract as a
whole. This is true because as we move toward maturity the principal
of the debt is being reduced, thereby removing more and more of the
principal to which the lo,v rate applies. But under a precomputation
system the entire finance charge is included in the obligation of the
debtor and upon prepayment or refinancing the creditor is allowed
to retain that fraction of the finance charge which is "earned." By
standard methods of calculating refunds this "earned" fraction is a
function of time elapsed and principal outstanding. But if this fraction is applied to the entire finance charge it will produce a greater
4. See CURRAN ~2-25, and chart 2, at 158-66. Under many statutes governing small
loan companies which compute charges under the per cent per month method, lenders
have been authorized to use the alternative method of precomputing the amount of
finance charges payable over the period of the installment contract as a whole. Com•
putation is made on the basis of the applicable per cent per month charge and on
the assumption that all installments will be made on schedule. The total amount of
finance charges is then added to the principal at the time the credit is advanced,
and the debtor pays back the sum of the principal and the finance charge in periodic
installments.
5. Since the obligation to the creditor includes the total finance charge, if the
debtor prepays the creditor would be receiving unearned finance charges unless an
adjustment were made. There are various procedures for calculating amounts to be
returned by the creditor in the event of a prepayment of principal. The most common
method required by statute is the "rule of 78," or "sum of the digits" formula. Under
this method, allocation of finance charges is made as follows: First, the numbers of the
months of the credit term are added. For example: in a 12-month credit, we add the
numbers one through twelve, arriving at a sum of 78. Second, the finance charge is
allocated to each month of the credit by multiplying it by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the number of the specific month in reverse chronological order and the
denominator of which is the sum of the numbers of the period of the credit. For
example: for a 12-month credit in which the finance charge is $6, the charge allocable
to the first month is l¾s X • $6, and the charge allocable to the second month
l½s X $6. If any part of the principal is prepaid, the creditor is required to refund
to the debtor the "unearned" portion of the finance charge. The problem of prepay•
ment is particularly important because refinancing is a very common occurrence,
Refinancing is treated as a prepayment in full of the outstanding credit and a simultaneous entry into another credit contract.
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yield to the creditor because the entire finance charge is made up
of a higher proportion of high rate charge than is the finance charge
for the elapsed portion of the contract calculated on a non-precomputation basis. The high percentage of cases in which the borrower
refinances makes this additional return yielded of some significance
to the lender. 6
2. Credit union loans. There is more uniformity of computational method in credit union operations than in any other segment
of the finance industry. The usual statutory mandate allows the
board of directors to set a maximum finance charge not in excess of
one per cent per month on the declining balance. Credit unions have
almost unanimously retained this computational method through
the years despite trends in different directions in other segments of
the consumer finance industry.7 Recently, however, some credit
unions have shmvn interest in adopting a precomputation system.
3. Retail installment sales. In the nineteenth century, when merchants began to sell their goods on credit, the courts were forced
to decide how to treat the credit charge under the usury laws,
which set limits on the amount that could be charged for a
loan of money or forbearance of debt. As a result, the timeprice doctrine emerged; the courts held that one can offer his goods
for sale at two prices-a credit, or time, price and a cash price. The
difference between the two--the time-price differential---<:an exceed
the amount allowable under the usury law because it is not interest. 8
Moreover, the courts have upheld the time-price doctrine even when
the credit price is determined by merely adding a finance charge to
the cash price. Doubtless this background had a part in the development of the practice in sales finance transactions of adding the finance charge to the cash price of the article and having the total repaid in installments. This is the add-on method of computing finance charges, and is the standard method used today in installment
sales transactions. 9 Furthermore, the add-on method of computation
6. For a treatment of the extent of the advantage of precomputation over per cent
per month on prepaid loans, see MoRS 28-33. Dr. Mors cites a New York Banking Department study indicating that during a period from 1945 to 1957, about eighty per
cent of all consumer finance company loans in New York were refinanced. MoRS 32-33,
109-11.
7. See CURRAN, chart 6, at 194-203. See also JoHNsON 22-25; MoRS 12-13.
8. For a discussion of the time-price doctrine and a statement of authorities con•
ceming it, see Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical
Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 137, 143 (1958); Warren,
Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 841-51
(1959); Comment, Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General
Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 303-10 (1960).
9. See MoRS 19-24. The finance charge may be stated in terms of percentages
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is the easiest to apply to what is often an irregular amount-the unpaid balance of the cash price. This is an important factor in a business where the initial finance charge computation has to be made by
a seller rather than by a financial institution.10
Virtually all of the retail installment sales acts (most of them
passed between 1948 and 1955) adopted the add-on method of com•
putation for rate ceiling purposes. Most rate ceiling provisions are
stated in terms of either per cent per year or dollars per hundred
per year. A few prescribe the per cent per month times the number
of months method of computation, with the total being added on
at the inception of the transaction. Other rate ceilings are in terms
of per cent per month on the declining balance, to be computed in
advance and added on; this essentially amounts to precomputation.
Still other statutes allow an add-on charge plus a monthly charge,
with the latter being precomputed and added on in advance.11
4. Installment loan transactions. When commercial banks en•
tered the consumer financing field in the 1930's, they did so in two
ways: indirectly, by purchasing retail installment sales contracts from
dealers, and directly, by making personal loans. For the most part
their indirect financing of consumer sales did not require legislative
sanction because the time-price doctrine insulated these operations
from the usury statutes, although in some states there was a problem
caused by the limitation of the rate of discount a bank might charge
upon the purchase of a note or other obligation. Their personal
loans could not, of course, enjoy the sanctuary provided by the timeprice doctrine, but as banks became more active in this field statutes
were passed allowing them to make personal loans at rates in excess
(6% per year) or dollars per hundred (six dollars per hundred per year), with no
change in result. If the annual rate is six dollars per hundred and the term of the
credit is two years, the finance charge on a credit of $100 would be $12, The debtor
would receive $100 and would be required to pay back to the creditor $112 over the
term, of the credit in installments. The calculation of the finance charge under the
add-on method is made at the inception of the credit, and the finance charge is
computed on the assumption that the payments will be made on time. Hence, the
same problems in regard to prepayment previously discussed in note 5 exist here,
The statutes tend to deal with them in similar ways. In general, the "rule of 78" is
prescribed to govern refunds when prepayments arc made. With respect to late
payments, it is common for statutes to prescribe delinquency charges expressed in
terms of a certain percentage of the delinquent installment, subject to an overall
dollar maximum for any one installment.
10. "The main reason that finance companies suggested that sellers use add-on in
preference to discount rates in computing finance charges to consumers probably lies
in the simplicity of computation. Simplicity was important because many small sellers
were not well versed in financing procedures and practices and obtained help from
financing agencies." MoRS 22-23.
11. Sec CURRAN, charts 12 &: 13, at 256-77.
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of those prescribed by the usury acts. Some of these statutes were not
restricted to banks, but covered any entity, except small loan licensees, which made the kinds of loans permitted under the statute.12
Finance charges on commercial bank loans are usually made
under the discount computational method. The traditional discount pattern molded the shape of the statutes which set rate ceilings on personal installment loans made by both commercial and
industrial banks. 13 In many states the lender was simply allowed to deduct in advance the contract rate of interest permitted by the usury
statute for the period over which repayment was scheduled. Thus the
discount method of computation remains predominant under the installment loan laws. However, the add-on method is employed in a
substantial number of jurisdictions, and a modification of the addon scheme is used in those jurisdictions in which interest is precomputed on the declining balance.
5. Revolving credit. The traditional thirty-day charge account,
which permits buyers to pay for their goods within thirty days of
billing without any finance charge, proved inadequate to meet the
credit needs of retail "f?uyers of soft goods. Furthermore, sellers of
soft goods found it infeasible to use the traditional installment sale
contract. Thus, in recent years soft-goods retailers have turned from
•
the old charge account to the revolving credit account. A retailer offering revolving credit assesses the buyer's credit worthiness and assign~
a certain credit balance which the buyer is entitled to carry so long
as he makes monthly payments of a prescribed amount. When the
buyer pays off his outstanding balance his monthly payments cease,
only to commence once more when he makes his next credit purchase at that retail outlet.14
Computation of the credit charge in revolving credit transactions

"

12. See CURRAN 65-75. The entry of industrial or "Morris Plan" banks into the
area of consumer credit preceded that of commercial J:>anks by two decades. For a
discussion of the development and regulation of industrial banking, see CURRAN 52-60;
JOHNSON 25-26; MoRS 15-19.
13. See MoRS 18-19. Under the discount method, the appropriate rate of finance
charge is applied to the principal of the credit and the resulting finance charge is
deducted in advance. For example, if the rate is 6% per year and the principal is
$100 to be repaid in installments over a term of two years, the computation would be:
6% X $100 X 2, resulting in a finance charge of $12. The $12 finance charge is then
deducted from the $100 principal, leaving a net advance to the debtor of $88 to be
repaid in periodic installments over the term of the credit. The rate may also be
stated in dollars per hundred per year. Under the di~count method the finance charge
is calculated at the inception of the credit extension on the assumption that the payments will be made on time. Prepayments and late payments are treated in the same
manner as that discussed in notes 5 & 9 supra.
14. See generally JOHNSON 47-50. For detailed treatments of the subject, see CoLE,
REVOLVING CREDIT (1957); Comment, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 330-48 (1960).

1292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:1285

can be made in a number of different ways, but usually the charge
is a fixed percentage of the balance in the account at a given time
each month. A very common practice is to charge the customer 1½
per cent of the balance in his account at the beginning of a billing
period. For instance, if the outstanding balance at the beginning
of the period is $100, the $1.50 finance charge is added to the $100,
and the debtor's balance then becomes $101.50, which must be
repaid in future monthly payments.
6. Check credit plans.· The commercial banks saw no reason to
leave the revolving credit concept to the retailers, and therefore
developed check credit plans as their entry into the field. The borrower is extended a line of credit up to a maximum amount, upon
which he may draw, by writing checks on the bank. He is obliged
to make monthly payments of a specified amount. The computational method employed to determine the finance charge is the revolving credit method, usually at a rate of one per cent per month
on the balance plus a flat charge (commonly twenty-five cents) per
check. The chief computational problem from the bank's standpoint
is how to decide the amount of the principal balance upon which the
:finance charge is to be computed. Different methods have been employed to arrive at the outstanding principal balance £or a billing
period, ranging from an average of the actual daily balances to the
balance outstanding on one day of the month.15
The foregoing discussion shows that the different segments of
the consumer credit industry use different methods to compute the
charges which they make £or their service. For some, such as smallloan companies and credit unions, the method of computation
adopted by the creditor was a reflection of the form of computation
prescribed by the applicable rate ceiling statute. In other cases the
method of computation set out in the rate ceiling statute reflected
the method used in the business practice of the regulated creditor;
for example, the retail installment sales rate ceilings were set in
terms of dollars per hundred per year add-on, the computational
method which had previously been adopted in the industry, under
the influence of the time-price doctrine and because of its convenience. The emphasis of consumer credit legislation has been to set
rate ceilings rather than to require disclosure of finance charges in
terms of rates. Some consumer credit statutes contain no requirement of disclosure of finance charges; others require only that the
dollar amount of the finance charge be disclosed.
15. See generally CURRAN 76-79.
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Although the various segments of the finance industry are regulated by different statutes and compute their finance charges in different ways, they perform the same general function-the financing
of the American consumer. In many cases they are in direct competition with each other for the consumer's business. It is in these areas of
actual or potential competition that full disclosure of finance charges
is most important. For example, consider the case of a man who
wants to buy an automobile which has a cash price of $2500. He may
be told by the dealer that he can finance the purchase at a rate of six
dollars per hundred per year on a thirty-month contract through a
sales finance company. A bank might offer to lend him the purchase
price at six per cent per year, discounted, with a maturity period
of twenty-four months. He might also obtain a loan from a small
loan company whose rates are 2½ per cent per month on the first
$200, two per cent per month on the next $300, and % of one per
cent on the remaining balance, over thirty-six months. A credit
union to which the buyer belongs lends money at one per cent per
month and pays an annual patronage dividend of uncertain amount.
In addition, the buyer may have a savings account at a bank on
which he receives four per cent per year interest. It is virtually impossible for the average buyer to determine which of the competing
credit suppliers is offering him the cheapest credit. A comparison
of these different sources of credit would require a level of mathematical sophistication clearly not possessed by the average consumer..
An additional difficulty is that the consumer might not fully understand the meaning of the rate quoted to him in those instances in
which rates are in fact quoted. He may not know that on an installment contract, six dollars per hundred per year is not the same as
six per cent interest on the declining balance of the debt, but is
nearly twelve per cent interest on a twelve-month contract.16
It is in response to the need of the consumer to be told more
about the cost of credit and to be able to compare competing sources
16. In a regular installment contract part of the principal is paid back with each
installment; hence, in a loan of $100 repayable in 12 monthly payments, the average
outstanding balance over the period of the loan is about $50. Thus, if the contract calls for a rate of $6 per hundred add-on or the actual rate is about double the stated rate, since the finance charge is calculated on the basis of the outstanding balance at the inception of the contract ($100). Under the constant-ratio
method of computation, the actual rate increases on longer term contracts when
add-on or discount methods are used; the rate of increase is much greater under the
discount method. See JOHNSON 114-17. A number of studies have shown that consumers
consistently underestimate the level of finance rates. See JUSTER &: SHAY, CONSUMER
SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL lNVES'I'IGATION 47-75
(1964) (hereinafter cited as JUSTER&: SHAY); MoRS 80-91.
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of credit that the Douglas Bill was proposed.17 Generally speaking,
the Douglas Bill requires all consumer credit suppliers to state their
finance charges in terms of an annual interest rate and in terms of
a dollar amount. 18 The Douglas Bill is based upon two premises.
First, it is assumed that the consumer will benefit from increased
competition in the credit market, and that, for competition to work,
the consumer must be in a position to know which of competing
creditors is offering the lowest credit price. In order for this comparison to be made, the competing credit rates must be disclosed in
a manner suitable for comparison. The necessary comparison can
be made only if all credit suppliers are required to quote their finance charges in terms of a time rate, since time rates alone allow
comparisons to be made regardless of differences in the amount of
principal or in the maturity of the credit and variations in the repayment schedule. Second, for disclosure to be effective it must be
in a form which is familiar to the consumer. With respect to the cost
of credit, the consumer is familiar with the meaning of both dollar
costs and annual interest rates, since the two credit transactions most
familiar to the average consumer are the home mortgage and the savings account. For these reasons the Douglas Bill requires the disclosure of finance charges in terms of both dollar cost and annual interest rate.
We recognize that disclosure of finance charges is an important
problem in the consumer credit area, and we view the Douglas Bill
as one possible solution to the problem. However, the purpose of
this article is not to debate the merits of the Douglas Bill. It is our
objective to examine the theoretical basis for disclosure of finance
charges in the light of the practical operations of the consumer
credit business with a view toward indicating a possible solution to
the problem of disclosure, having due regard for the interests of
both consumers and credit suppliers.
II.

FUNCTIONS OF DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES

The cost of credit may be disclosed to a consumer either in
terms of dollar amounts or in terms of a rate based on time. If a rate
17. The most recent version of the Douglas Bill is S. 2275, 89th Cong,, 1st Scss.
(1965). The extensive hearings on prior versions of this bill are: Hearings on S. 1740
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banlting and Currency, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Consumer Credit Labeling Bill); Hearings on S. 1740 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962) (Truth in Lending); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com•
mittee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st &: 2d Scss. pts. 1·2 (1963-64) (Truth
in Lending).
18. S. 2275, supra note 17, § 4.
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based on time is used, it can be an annual or a monthly rate. As
we have seen, the annual time rate methods in common use are simple interest, discount, and dollars per hundred per year. In order
to decide whether the best method of disclosing finance charges is
in terms of dollar amounts or in terms of one of these time rates
we must first explore the functions to be performed by disclosure
of finance charges.
There are three reasons for requiring disclosure of finance
charges. First, the user of credit should know its cost in order
to judge whether the extension of credit is worth the price. That
method of disclosure which most meaningfully describes cost under
the circumstances of the particular case should be chosen. Second,
the disclosure should be made in such a manner that the user of
credit can determine which of alternate sources of credit (which may
or may not involve the same type of credit transaction) offers him
the best deal. This second aspect of disclosure may conflict with the
first, because it may require uniformity of method of disclosure for
comparisons to be made. To the extent that some methods of disclosure are more informative in some types of credit transactions
than in others, if only a single method is adopted, a compromise
may be necessary. Third, the disclosure should allow the potential
user of credit to determine whether it would be better to forgo
dependence upon credit and to rely upon cash resources instead.
This is really an aspect of the second function in that in both situations a comparison is being made between sources of funds. Thus,
disclosure may be said to perform a descriptive and a shopping
function.

A. Descriptive Function
Dollar disclosure of finance charges is common practice in the
field of sales financing. Here retail installment sales laws generally
require the seller to disclose the dollar amount of the finance charge
as a separate item in the contract. Time rate disclosure is typical
in small loan transactions; the buyer is informed that he is paying,
for example, three per cent per month for the first $200, two per cent
per month for the next $300, and one per cent per month for all
excess amounts.19 Time rates can be disclosed in either annual or
19. See JOHNSON 31-32, for methods of disclosure in small loans transactions. Under
the small loans acts the debtor need only be informed what the rate ceilings are in
small loan transactions. However, since the actual rates charged are usually at the
ceiling level in this segment of the industry, compliance with the statutes amounts to
disclosure of the actual charge made.
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monthly terms. One per cent per month on the declining balance
equals twelve per cent nominal annual interest. Disclosure of rates
as dollars_per hundred per annum is an alternate method of stating
an annual time rate.
1. Dollar Disclosure v. Time Rate Disclosure

In some transactions disclosure in terms of dollars is more meaningful, while in others disclosure in terms of a time rate may be
more intelligible to the consumer. The prices of goods and services
are usually stated in terms of dollar amounts, and consumers are
accustomed to making evaluations on this basis. The price of money,
on the other hand, is normally stated in terms of a time rate. In a
transaction involving both the extension of credit and the sale of
goods or services, the method of disclosure of the finance charge
establishes the characterization of the transaction in the mind of the
consumer. For example, a person financing the purchase of a house
by means of a long-term mortgage normally separates the transaction
into nvo parts: the purchase of the house and the borrowing of
money to pay for it. The buyer considers that the house costs
$40,000 and that the loan of $25,000 obtained to help pay for the
house costs 6 per cent per year. However, if the quotation were in
terms of the total dollar cost of the transaction, the buyer would see
his house as costing nearly $60,000 on a twenty-five year mortgage.
This "cost" figure for the house does not allow for meaningful comparison with the dollar costs of other things that the buyer may purchase. For instance, a person buying a $17 fan to be paid for in five
monthly installments of four dollars does not normally separate the
transaction into a purchase and an extension of credit to pay for the
purchase. He is simply buying a fan. The $20 amount accurately indicates to him what the fan costs. The finance charge in this transaction in terms of a time rate-over seventy per cent nominal annual
interest-may only lead him to believe that he is paying an exorbitant rate of "interest."
The simple explanation for the different manner in which a
consumer looks at these nvo transactions is, of course, the time differential in the nvo cases. The payment of a dollar today is not
comparable to the obligation to pay a dollar in ten or twenty years.
A comparison requires a calculation of the value of the use of
money. This comparison can be made meaningfully by talking in
terms of interest rates based on time. Wliere the time factor is not
significant, as in the fan situation, the straight dollar comparison
gives a more accurate picture.
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Another problem which must be faced in choosing between dollar and time rate disclosure is raised by the size of the transaction.
Finance charges can be divided into two elements: (1) a charge for
the use of money, which can be termed the interest charge (this includes both the economist's concept of "pure interest" and the compensation for the risk of not being paid), and (2) service charges for
administrative costs with respect to the credit, such as the costs or
processing the credit and investigating the risk. 20 If the amount of
credit extended is very large, the proportion of the credit charge
applicable to service charges will be small and the proportion applicable to interest charges will be large. The converse will be true
where the amount of credit extended is small. Thus, a comparison
of how much a smalf amount of credit should cost with how m:uch
a large amount should cost cannot be made without taking into
account service costs. However, there is a tendency to compare specific credit charges with some hypothetical standard of what the cost
of credit should be. The best known examples of the price of
money to the average citizen are the amount his money brings when
lent to someone else (savings accounts and government bonds) and
the amount he pays for money on his real estate mortgage. In these
examples the rate is low and the finance charge is made up almost
entirely of interest as opposed to service costs. The use of this kind
of example has led to the so-called "six per cent myth." Therefore,
if the method of disclosure invites comparison of transactions involving high service costs with transactions involving low service costs,
the credit consumer may be misled in his value judgments.

2. Disclosure of Dollar Amount of Monthly Payment
The sale of goods on installment contracts has been analyzed
above in terms of the sale of a product and the simultaneous extension of credit to finance the purchase. This analysis may require some
refinement. Customarily, sales and leases have been treated as diverse
concepts which can be given separate treatment. Actually, in the
modern commercial world the two concepts have often become
blurred. A credit sale covering the useful life of a product is economically similar to a lease of the product over the same period.
For example, the purchase of an automobile on credit and the purchase of a five-year lease of that automobile may be economically
more similar than they are different. There seems to be a trend toward longer time-spans in installment sales contracts while at the same
20. See JOHNSON, ch. 2; MoRS 75-78.
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time built-in obsolescence has become commonplace in consumer
goods. The two trends may converge so that in many cases the useful life of the product and the time-span of the credit are substantially the same. Where this is so it may be misleading to consider the
transaction as primarily a purchase and sale. It might be more useful
to recognize it as the payment by the "buyer" for the use of the product over its useful life. This analysis is particularly convenient if the
proportion of the people who pay cash for the product is very small.
Where such is the case, employment of dollar amounts to indicate
the purchase price of either the product or the credit may not be
very descriptive. The amount of a monthly cash payment may, however, be very meaningful to the purchaser.
It is very difficult to generalize concerning the extent to which
buyers look.upon purchases in terms of the monthly dollar cost of
using the product. Undoubtedly, a substantial number of buyers
are accustomed to looking at 'their financial affairs in terms of their
monthly or weekly disposable incomes and can make appraisals of
their ability to pay only in those terms. For them, any disclosure
which cannot be translated into periodic terms is meaningless.21
It is clear, however, that any disclosure statute should take
into account the differing natures of the various consumer credit
transactions and the impact that any disclosure system is likely
to have on the various kinds of credit consumers. We have discussed
the three principal methods of disclosure: (I) total dollar cost of the
credit or of the product being purchased; (2) amount of the credit
charge expressed as a time rate; and (3) total monthly dollar cost
of the credit or of the product being purchased. That these various
methods are informative in some situations and misleading in others
has been demonstrated. For this reason it might be undesirable to
use certain kinds of disclosure in some classes of transactions. It
might be that no single method of disclosure of finance charges can
effectively further all the different objectives of disclosure. The only
21. Economists disagree concerning the extent to which demand for consumer credit ·
is elastic with respect to such factors as the amount of the monthly payment, the
amount of the down payment, or the level of the finance charge. One group assumes
that consumer demand is most influenced by the size of the monthly payments and
thus that a change in finance rates affects demand only to the extent that it changes
the amount of the monthly payment. Since increases in finance charges spread over
the length of the contract raise the monthly payments only slightly, this group argues
that demand for consumer credit is relatively inelastic with respect to changes in
finance charges. A 1964 study has led Juster and Shay to conclude that there is per•
haps greater sensitivity to changes in finance charge rates than had been assumed,
but only among families described as "unrationed" consumers: this classification
includes those families with an economic position which is stable enough that they
can borrow additional amounts of credit from low rate sources. See JUSTER &: SHAY 6-46,
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alternatives, then, would be to require multiple methods of disclosure or to tailor disclosure requirements to classes of transactions.
B. Shopping Function
It has long been a part of public policy in the United States to
rely upon competition to ensure that the consumer receives the best
product or service obtainable at the lowest possible price. However,
price competition functions best when the various vendors are all
selling the s~me product. When each merchant sells something a
little different from the others, or when each merchant uses a different standard for measuring the price of his product, price competition is more difficult.
Little can be done about the problem of product differentiation.
Different credit packages will continue to be available on the market, and such diversity is desirable. Nevertheless, even within a
system of diverse products uniformity of method of price quotation
may be obtainable. Ideally, we should select the method of disclosing finance charges which best lends itself to the comparison .of
credit transactions that are not identical.
To rely exclusively on dollar disclosure of the cost of credit does
not seem promising in this regard. 22 A person desiring to borrow
$1000 will find it very difficult to compare the offer by one lender
of a two-year contract calling for the payment of $1200 in twentyfour equal monthly installments of $50, and the offer by another
lender of a three-year contract calling for the payment of $1368 in
thirty-six equal monthly installments of $38. The borrower may prefer a long or short contract, and this may affect his judgment, but
it is difficult for him to tell whether the higher or lower dollar cost
is more "expensive."
The difficulty involved in comparing dollars payable at different
times, which is the core of the problem in the last example, can be
avoided by the use of rates that are a function of time rather than
of dollar amounts. Thus, if all grantors of credit were required to
quote charges on the basis of a time rate, such as per cent per year
on the declining balance, the consumer could be sure that the one
quoting the lowest rate was asking least for his credit, regardless of
the maturity time or the amount of the loan. This does not mean
the consumer would necessarily accept the least expensive offer. It
might be "cheaper" for a low-income consumer to pay less per
month for a longer period, even if the rate is higher; but at least
22. See MoRS 39-43.
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the factors bearing on the choice are clarified. If the consumer is
making a sacrifice in order to pay less per month, the rate will tell
him so.
It is also important to recognize the limitations of the shopping
function. Insistence on uniformity for the purpose of comparison is
justified only to the extent that shopping is feasible. To facilitate
shopping, it is important that all alternative sources of credit quote
their charges on the same basis. However, if in certain types of
transactions some sources of credit are available and some as a practical matter are not, uniformity of disclosure need apply only to
those sources that are in fact available.
1. Cash Loans

We can start with a breakdown bet.1veen cash loan transactions
and credit sales of goods or services. In a sense this dichotomy is
artificial, since practically all consumer cash loans are made for the
purpose of paying for goods or services (which may have been
bought prior to the extension of credit). On the other hand, the
dichotomy is useful in analyzing the shopping problem. Since money
is fungible, consumer shopping for money can drive the price of
money to a competitive level. Assuming that a uniform system of.
quoting rates is adopted, the consumer can readily shop for money
itself, and competition in the credit industry will be more effective.
Different segments of the consumer credit industry charge significantly different rates. For instance, commercial banks normally
charge lower rates on personal loans than do small loan companies.
Part of the explanation lies in the credit worthiness of their customers and in statutory limitations on the size of loans that each
type of lender is allowed to make, but such segmentation seems
artificial. Suppliers of a fungible commodity could serve most segments of the market by adjusting rates to credit risks. Undoubtedly
some customers of small loan companies would qualify as borrowers
from commercial banks. It may be that the difference in techniques
of disclosure of charges tends to impede competition between the
t.1\l'o groups. If this is true, a common method of computation for
disclosure purposes would make price differences more apparent and
thus increase competition.

2. Credit Sales of Goods and Services
Shopping for credit is effective whenever credit can be separated
from the product or service to be bought with the credit. A person
desiring to buy a new Chevrolet on an installment contract can
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effectively shop for both the car and the credit. Similar Chevrolets
are fungible; since all dealers quote cash prices, the buyer can choose
the one quoting the lowest price. He can also shop for the cheapest
credit if all lenders of credit, including both sales finance companies
and cash lenders, are required to quote prices on a common basis,
such as in terms of a rate based on time.
Of course, the vendor of a differentiated product who also provides credit financing can arbitrarily allocate part of his price to
finance charges and part to the purchase price of the product. However, there are practical restraints on this allocation if the seller makes
many sales to cash buyers and if the amount of the finance charge
is large enough to encourage buyers to shop for the best credit rate.
In this situation, if the vendor must quote a cash price, he cannot
allocate too much of the credit price to the finance charge without
incurring the risk that buyers will accept his unrealistically low
cash price and finance elsewhere. He runs less risk by allocating a
disproportionately high amount to cash price, but by doing so he
might injure his cash market. At any rate, this kind of problem cannot be entirely avoided whether there is uniformity in credit charge
disclosure or not.
On the other hand, if the vendor sells almost exclusively to credit
buyers, as do those who deal only with low-income buyers, or if the
credit charge is small, there is great leeway with respect to allocation
of finance charges. For example, it is common for some credit clothiers and jewelers to make no separate charge for credit; their prices
are quoted as the cost of buying the goods over a given period of
months with no allocation made between the cash price of the goods
and the cost of credit. Other dealers may state a charge for credit
that is unrealistically low as compared to the cost to the dealer of
extending the credit. These dealers may emphasize in their adve:i~
tising that no charge or a very low charge is being made for credit.
In fact, the consumer may be paying a large price for credit, since
the price of the goods sold may have been greatly inflated. This
points up one danger in overemphasizing the cost of credit as a shopping device: it encourages some merchants to mislead consumers
into believing that they are receiving a benefit in paying low finance
charges when the total credit price of the product sold may actually
be excessive. One observer has pointed out that in poverty areas
customers tend to be captives of the dealer because of their lack of
credit worthiness. 23 In such a market there is ho shopping for credit,
,

23.

CAPLOVII'Z, THE POOR PAY MORE,

ch, 2 (1963).
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and therefore it is doubtful whether disclosure as a protective measure has any beneficial effect.
Shopping for credit is less effective whenever credit is closely
tied to the goods or services to be bought with it. For example, assume that a credit buyer goes into a department store to purchase
an.item for a cash price of $17.50. Disclosing to him in his contract
that finance charges will equal a stated annual rate means much less
to him than a similar disclosure means to the purchaser of a new car,
because it is more difficult for the former buyer to shop for credit,
as such. It is unlikely that he will go to a cash lender to borrow
money to pay for his purchase. Consequently, there is no compelling reason to have cash lenders and department stores disclose final).ce charges on a uniform basis. The chief alternative open to the
credit buyer in this example is another retailer. In this kind of shopping, the price of goods and the price of credit are inextricably
bound together. The buyer must compare the combined price of
product and credit at the two competing sources. To the extent that
a large proportion of goods sold by competing department stores
and similar retailers are not precisely fungible, the problem is further compounded. Retailer A sells electric fans for $23 on revolving
credit, charging 1½ per cent of the monthly balance and requiring
a monthly payment of at least ten per cent. Retailer B, a mail order
company, sells its own brand of electric fan for $17 cash or for four
monthly payments of $5. The extent to which the price of credit
affects the buying decision with respect to this kind of transaction
is problematical.
A relatively recent development has changed to some extent the
problem considered in the previous paragraph. The check credit
plans of commercial banks make it possible to shop independently
for credit even in the type of situation just described. These plans
are becoming popular in some sections of the country, but in many
areas are not yet a major factor. However, it is important to consider this development because it is a good example of a new practice created to meet new competitive needs.
3. Extent of Credit Shopping
It is extremely difficult, in the absence of empirical evidence, to
categorize transactions in which shopping for credit is a substantial
factor. Theoretically, credit shopping can exist with respect to any
sale transaction in which the credit balance is as large as the smallest
cash loan available from normal commercial sources. It is probable,
however, that credit shopping is actually much more limited than
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this would suggest. The sale of new automobiles presents a clear case
in which credit shopping is pr~cticed; it is difficult to ascertain the
extent to which shopping for credit exists with regard to lower
priced
items. such as appliances and furniture.
,
The sale of small-ticket items is a particularly troublesome area.
It is questionable to what extent disclosure of finance charges in
terms of a time rate performs any useful function in furthering
credit shopping here. Moreover, it is very difficult to obtain any
meaningful uniformity of disclosure. We· suspect that buyers are
more interested in learning the total dollar price of an item than
they are in being told that the finance charge amounts to two per
cent per month or twenty-four per cent per year. The value of disclosure as an aid to credit shopping is even more questionable if
the dealer sells only to credit buyers and states that there is no
charge for credit. Requiring him to break down his price into a
cash price and a finance charge and to disclose the time rate of the
finance· charge is likely to result in the establishment of a highly
arbitrary rate which would be of little use to a consumer.
Disclosure of finance charges serves another shopping function;
it enables the potential borrower to decide whether he will use credit
or draw upon his liquid assets to meet his needs. If a person desiring
to buy a $3,000 automobile realized that he must pay finance
charges on that sum at the rate of eighteen per cent per year, he
might choose to withdraw the necessary funds from his savings account on which he is earning under five per cent per year. At present, since finance charges in this kind of transaction are quoted in
terms of dollars per hundred, purchasers may not be acutely aware
of the disparity between the costs of financing and the earnings from
their savings accounts. It can thus be argued that since savings institutions quote earnings on deposits in terms of annual interest, fimince charges should also be stated in these terms in order to provide maximum comparability.
It is uncertain to what extent consumers actually engage in this
kind of shopping for alternate sources of funds. The Juster-Shay ·
study indicates that some consumers are sensitive to finance charges
as a basis for deciding whether to use credit or liquid assets.24
Apparently, credit price sensitivity is highest in a particular group
of consumers-those who have savings accounts and certain other
indicia of economic stability. For this higher economic group, the
statement of finance charges in terms of annual interest would pre24. See JUSTER &: SHAY 6-46.
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sumably be of some benefit. On the other hand, there are many
consumers who have no savings accounts or who prefer to hold their
savings in reserve for emergencies. For this group, a quotation of
consumer credit rates in terms of annual interest is of less impor.tance.

III.

FEASIBILITY OF DISCLOSING FINANCE CHARGES

The foregoing analysis of the functions performed by disclosure
of finance charges indicates that in some transactions disclosure in
terms of a time rate would be beneficial to consumers. In other
transactions time rate disclosure may be a neutral factor, neither
helping nor harming the consumer. Only in short-term, small-size
credit transactions is time rate disclosure possibly harmful in that
it gives a misleading impression of the cost of credit.25 We can there. fore conclude that in the absence of other considerations it would
theoretically be sound to :require time rate disclosure in most transactions. However, time rate disclosure cannot be given by the credit
supplier without some economic cost; any evaluation of the desirability of required time rate disclosure must take into account these
economic costs. It would seem sensible to require time rate disclosure only in those cases in which the economic benefit to be derived
from such disclosure outweighs the economic cost of providing it.
There are two types of time rates which might be used if time
rate disclosure were required. The first type expresses the finance
charge as a rate based on the declining balance of the debt as it is
repaid. For example, if there is a credit of $1,200 with a finance
charge of $72, and the debt is repayable in twelve monthly installments of $106, the finance charge is calculated in terms of the average amount of principal outstanding over the term of the credit.
Thus, the rate would be approximately 11.08 per cent per year or
0.92 per cent per month. 26 The second type of time rate expresses
the finance charge as a rate based on the total amount of the credit
25. We suspect that if a merchant were required to disclose his finance charges in
small transactions in terms of a shockingly high rate, he would lower the rate to a
tolerable level by arbitrarily allocating a greater part of the total credit price of the
product to the cash price. This can be done by any merchant who sells a large pro•
portion of his goods on credit. The net result is that cash buyers would have to
subsidize credit buyers.
26. This calculation was made according to the constant ratio method of charge
distribution. Under that method, it is assumed that each installment payment Is
credited partly to the amount financed (principal) and partly to finance charge, in the
same proportion that the original amount financed and the original finance charge
bore to the original debt. Interest charges can also be calculated according to the
annuity method of charge distribution. By that method the interest charges for the
example given are 10,9% annual and 0.93% monthly. See JOHNSON 108-10.
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at the inception of the credit. Using the same example, the rate
would be six dollars per hundred per year, or fifty cents per hundred
dollars per month. In the subsequent discussion, the first type of
time rate will be referred to as "interest on declining balance" and
the second type as "dollar add-on."
The question whether the use of a time rate is feasible has two
aspects. First, is it possible to give such a rate in a certain type of
transaction? If so, is the economic cost of giving a time rate worth
the economic benefit to be derived from the disclosure?

A. Impossibility of Time Rate Disclosure
It is mathematically possible to give a time rate whenever the
amount of the credit, the amount of the finance charge, and the
amount and time of the payments are known. If the payments are
regular in amount and interval, the calculation of a time rate can
be made using a simple formula. If the payments are irregular in
either amount or interval, the calculation becomes more difficult
as the irregularities increase. In cases involving highly irregular repayment schedules, the use of computers may be needed, but there
is no situation in which the determination cannot be made. However, if any one of the factors named-amount of credit, amount of
finance charge, or amount and time of payments--is not known, it
is impossible to give a time rate.
If the purpose of time rate disclosure is to tell the consumer
how much he is being charged so that he can decide whether to enter into the contract,, then it is vital that the disclosure be made
before the contract is made. In some situations it is not possible to
make accurate time rate disclosure at the inception of the transaction. There are two common examples: revolving charge accounts
and check credit plans.27
27. Revolving charge accounts are of two types, those offered by retailers and those
• offered by banks or other financial institutions. With a retailer revolving charge
account the customer may purchase goods at the retail store with which he has the
account, and the purchases are debited to an open account. Normally the retailer will
not allow charges above a certain figure. The amounts debited to the customer's
account ~re payable by the customer in installments. Since small retailers frequently
find it uneconomical to have their own individual revolving credit system, sometimes
a number of retailers will cooperate in forming a commonly owned agency to operate
such a system. However, it is becoming more common for retailers, large and small,
to rely upon the charge account plans of financial institutions. These plans are represented by such well-known credit cards as Bankamericard, Carte Blanche, and Diner's
Club. The retailer. allows the customer to pay for the goods by using his credit card.
The financial institution then pays the retailer the amount of the purchase, less a
charge. The financial institution then bills the customer. Terms of payment vary
considerably, but many organizations offer terms similar to those of retailer revolving
charge accounts.
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There are various ways of computing finance charges in revolving credit accounts, but we will take one common method as illustrative. Each customer is given a monthly billing date. On this date
each month he must pay a credit service charge equal to 1½ per cent
of the unpaid balance in his account at the beginning of the previous ·billing period. Assume that a customer, X, is assigned the first
day of the month as his billing date and that he opens an account
on February 4. He makes several purchases totaling $100 during
the month of February. On March 1 he will be billed. The bill will
~show an opening balance (unpaid amounts as of February 1) of zero
and purchases during the month of $100. Since the credit service
charge is calculated on the basis of the opening balance, no credit
service charge is made. If X pays the balance on or before March 31
he will not have to pay any credit charge. If he does not pay, the
$100 becomes the opening balance for the April 1 bill and a credit
service charge of $1.50 will be imposed. To illustrate the impossibility of giving time rate disclosure, we shall assume that X makes
the $100 purchase on February 4 and pays the $100 on March 31.
He has had fifty-five days of credit for which he must pay nothing.
However, if he pays the $100 on April 1 he has had fifty-six days of
credit for which he must pay $1.50. In one sense it might be said
that he paid $1.50 for one day's credit. If he does not pay the $100
in one payment but rather pays it off in installments over several
months, there will be additional finance cht1-rges and again the rate
will change. The time during the billing cycle when purchases are
made and the time when payment is tendered are varying factors
which make it impossible to tell the customer in advance how much
he will pay for credit in terms of either a dollar amount or a rate.
The most that can be done :with respect to disclosure by such a seller
is to explain to the customer the "rules of the game" so that he may
fully understand the conditions under which a credit service charge
is made and how it is calculated.
Check credit plans offered by banks raise similar problems.
Under one common plan the customer is given a credit of a fixed
dollar amount. He may ·write checks on the bank up to this amount;
when the bank clears a check, a loan is effectively made. The customer is charged one per cent per month on the daily balances in
his account. Unlike the 1½ per cent charge in the department store
plan just described, this one per cent is a true time rate, and if this
were the only charge that the bank made it could tell the customer
that he was being charged one per cent per month or twelve per cent
per year interest. However, it costs money to process checks and to
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make entries in an account; it is obviously more expensive to the
bank if a customer borrows $100 by writing ten checks of $10 each
than if he borrows the $100 by writing one check. To compensate
for the cost of processing, the bank makes an additional charge of
twenty-five cents per check. This twenty-five cent additional charge
applied to the above example makes a substantial difference in the
effective rate which the customer is paying for his credit.28 Since the
number of checks which will be ·written cannot be predicted in advance, no time rate or dollar amount can be disclosed to the customer. Again, the most that can be done is to disclose to the customer the method by which the finance charge will be calculated and
imposed.
It is possible in both of the above situations for the creditor to
construct "typical" patterns followed by users of its credit and to
state what the effective rate of charge would have been in such cases.
If a particular customer's buying habits fit the hypothetical pattern,
the disclosure is valuable. However, if the customer's buying habits
do not fit the hypothetical, the disclosure may be not only unhelpful, but even positively misleading. A consumer must be highly
sophisticated to compare his credit patterns accurately with those of
a hypothetical case and then to make the adjustments needed to
arrive at useful information.29

B. Economic Feasibility of Time Rate Disclosure
Open-end credit, such as that discussed in the preceding two
examples, is the only situation which presents a problem of impos28. If it is assumed that the $100 is paid off in five monthly_ installments, with the
first installment paid one month after the loan, the person who wrote ten checks
would pay about 22% annual interest and the person who wrote one check would
pay about 13% annual interest.
29. At the request of Professor Robert W. Johnson, a leading retailer selected at
random 205 of its revolving credit accounts and calculated, on the basis of the annual
interest on the declining balance, the actual rate of the finance charge for the period
September 10, 1964, through September 9, 1965. The results were as follows:
Annual Rate
Number of Accounts
Per Cent of Total
0%
1%- 9.9%
10%-14.9%
15%·16.9%
17%-17.9%
18%-18.9%
19%-20.9%

53
23
27
22
· 40
28
12

25.8%
11.2%
13.2%
10.7%
19.5%
13.7% .
5.9%

205
100.0%
This retailer used a billing system and charge identical to that described in the
text. If this sampling is representative of revolving credit accounts, it indicates clearly
that"it is not accurate to equate the 1½% monthly charge with an 18% annual rate
as is sometimes suggested.
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sibility. Some opponents of time rate disclosure have, however, attempted to fit ordinary closed-end installment contracts into the
same pattern. This view seems to have no merit. The arguments
made in behalf of this view may be assessed by taking an example
previously used. A borrower is given $1,200, which is to be repaid
in twelve monthly installments of $106. We have indicated that the
time rate on this contract is 11.08 per cent per year or six dollars
per hundred per year. However, in a large number of cases payments
are not made on time and late penalties are imposed. A surprisingly
large number of small loan contracts are never carried through to
completion according to their original terms. Rather, they are refinanced; the original loan is paid off by a second loan from the
same or a different lender. Furthermore, some loan contracts are
paid off before maturity. In most cases refinancing or prepayment
will result in the refund to the borrower of unearned finance
charges, a factor which may materially change the effective rate of
charge.30 If a substantial number, or, as in some situations, a large
majority, of installment credit contracts are not completed as
planned, any rate stated at the inception of the contract will in fact
be inaccurate. To the extent that these variations are material, time
rate disclosure could be deceptive.
If the only purpose of time rate disclosure is to state accurately
the actual cost of credit to the consumer, this argument would have
great weight. If, on the other hand, the principal function of time
rate disclosure is to tell the consumer which one of various sources
of credit is least expensive, accuracy with respect to the actual
amount which will in fact be charged is not vital. The variables are
created by the possibility that the consumer will incur penalties for
late payment, will prepay, or will refinance. In allowing the consumer
to shop for credit, these variables are material only if the competing
creditors used different methods of dealing with late payments, prepayments, and refinancing. For example, creditor A offers a loan at
twelve per cent and creditor B offers a loan of the same amount and
with the same repayment schedule at eleven per cent. B's loan appears to be cheaper. But suppose B exacts larger penalties for late
payments and refunds less of the finance charge in the event of prepayment or refinancing. If B's experience is that a majority of his
loans result in late payments, prepayments, or refinancing, he may
in fact be charging the majority of his customers more than A would
charge them. A person contemplating borrowing from either A or
30. See notes 5 &: 6 supra.
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B would therefore have to consider the likelihood of his completing
the contract as planned before choosing B's loan. However, if penalties for late payment and refunds of unearned finance charges for
prepayment or refinancing are standardized by statute, the possibility of deception in this kind of case is removed, and time rate
disclosure will allow the borrower to shop effectively. Even though
the variables discussed may affect the actual cost of the credit to the
consumer, if they are standardized they will not affect the relative
price of credit among competing lenders. Thus, with respect to installment contracts with set schedules of payments, rate disclosure
based on the assumption that the contracts will be completed as
written can be meaningfully made.
Another argument often made by opponents of time rate disclosure is that it is very difficult to take into account the irregularities
in a certain contract. This argument has been directed principally
against disclosure expressed in terms of interest on the declining
balance, but it also applies to some extent to dollar add-on disclosure. Suppose, for example, that a dealer offers to sell an automobile
for a cash price of $3,000. A buyer offers a used car valued at $1,000
as a down payment and wishes to finance the rest. The purchase is
made on December I. The dealer agrees that the $2,000 balance will
be financed on a contract requiring twenty-four monthly payments
of $96.67. As a selling point the dealer agrees that the first payment
will not be due until February I. Or, if the buyer is a seasonal
worker who is not paid during the two summer months (such as
some teachers), the dealer might agree to let the buyer postpone
the July and August payments until the end of the contract. The
finance charge in both cases is $320, and it can easily be computed
by the dealer. If his rate is eight dollars per hundred per year, it is
a simple matter to multiply $8 by 20 by 2. The monthly payment
is also easily computed by dividing $2,320 by 24. However, if in
either case the dealer is required to give the interest rate on the
declining balance or a true dollar add-on rate, he cannot do so without a complex mathematical calculation. The term of the credit is
not twenty-four months, but rather is almost twenty-five months in
the first case, and is nearly twenty-nine months in the other case.
Furthermore, in both hypotheticals some of the payments fall at
irregular intervals. For these reasons the true dollar add-on rate is
under his usual eight dollar rate. Nor can the true dollar add-on rate
or the interest rate on the declining balance be obtained from a standard precomputed chart. A chart can be prepared only on the basis
of a given term and a given schedule of payments.
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If exact rates were not required, a reasonable approximation of
either a dollar add-on rate or an interest rate on the declining balance could be given in relatively long-term contracts.81 Therefore,
economic feasibility in cases involving irregular contracts may depend upon whether approximations are acceptable. To require more
accurate disclosure than that indicated in the above examples may
mean that substantial additional economic costs will have to be incurred by lenders. It seems doubtful that business can operate effectively if complex calculations must be made with respect to every
transaction. The calculations could not be made by salesmen; rather,
they would have to be made by special personnel using mechanical
calculators. Although there is no basis for estimating what these additional economic costs might be, it is unlikely that the increased
accuracy obtainable by precise calculations is worth any substantial
expense.
In order for approximations to be meaningful with respect to
an irregular contract, the irregularities cannot depart too much from
the norm. In the case of highly irregular contracts it is not possible
to give even a reasonably accurate time rate except with the aid of
complex mathematical formulae. Such contracts are probably not
31. M~st contracts are irregular in some respects. Most irregularities are due to the
fact that (1) the period between the date of the contract and the due date for the first
installment is either shorter or longer than the period between all other payments, or
(2) the debtor is allowed to postpone some other payments. A person whose first pay•
ment falls due thirty days after the date of sale pays a slightly higher rate than the
person whose first payment falls due after forty-five days if in all other respects the
contracts are the same. Similarly, the debtor who can postpone some later payments
pays a lower rate than the one who cannot. In short-term contracts irregularities in
the time of first payment can cause significant distortion, but where the time is relatively long-one year or more-the distortion is much less. For the first example given
in the text (a delayed first payment in a 24-payment contract at $8 per SIOO per
year) the effective annual rate is $14.68% if the first payment is regular, i.e., made
one month after the contract date, and is 13.54% if the first payment is not made
until two months after the contract date. In most cases the first payment will not be
delayed as much as two months. Irregularities of this kind are ignored if a formula
which gives a rate based on the number of payments rather than exact lapse of time
is used. Under such a formula all contracts calling for twenty-four monthly payments
would yield the same rate, and slight differences in the lengths of the contracts arc not
considered. The following formulae will produce a rate which does not take into
account irregularities and which will always slightly overstate the actual rate paid if
there is a postponement in either the first or a subsequent payment:
Annual Interest Rate
Dollars Per Hundred Per Year
IOOPC
2PC
R=-R=---AN
A(N + 1)
R is the rate; P is 4 if payments arc quarterly, 12 if payments arc monthly, or 52 if
payments are weekly; if the payment period is other than monthly, weekly, or quarterly,
P is the closest whole number resulting from the division of 365 by the number of days
in the payment period; C is the finance charge; A is the amount financed; N is the
number of installments in the contract.
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common, since effective business operations normally require a high
degree of standardization. In the absence of contrary evidence they
can be dismissed as an economically insignificant factor.
With respect to small balance contracts, rate char:ts cannot be
used in precisely the same manner as they are used in larger transactions. In large transactions the amount financed can be rounded
off io the nearest ten dollars ·by adjusting the down payment, and
conceivably the creditor could quote a dollar add-on rate by making
a simple manual calculation. If, as is usually the case, a chart is used,
it can give the time rate for each dollar amount. However, in sinall
transactions the amount of the purchase, including sales taxes, will
commonly be an odd amount and often will not be rounded off to
the nearest five or ten dollar amount. If the retailer is required to
give a time rate for these small purchases, serious problems of feasibility arise. Considering the size of the transaction, it is clearly unreasonable to expect the retailer to make a separate manual calculation for every dollar amount; ~ut if the seller wants to use a chart
which will give an accurate statement of time rates, he would need
a chart which takes into account every dollar amount of purchase
price possible. A chart of this description would be highly cumbersome, and the economic costs of clerical time and clerical errors
would undoubtedly be great. Thus, for many merchants this type
of chart would be completely infeasible. A good example may be
dra·wn from mail order buying, which is a widespread practice. The
buyer has access to a catalogue describing the products offered for
sale and listing the cash price of each. In normal practice the buyer
may choose several items, which he lists on an order form. He then
adds the cash prices of the individual items. Suppose the total is $125.
The buyer is given the opportunity of deferring payment of this
$125 by signing an installment contract, and is referred to a table
which indicates that the finance charge on all amounts between
$120.01 and $130 is $13. He simply adds $13 to the $125 to arrive
at his total debt of $138. If the law required disclosure of the precise
time rate in catalogue sales, it would be necessary to have a chart
detailed to every dollar amount which could possibly be a total purchase price, and such a chart would be very difficult for mail order
buyers to use.
·
An alternative solution for small retail transactions, whether by
catalogue or otherwise, is to adapt the charts now in use. Charts
such as that described with respect to catalogue sales are also used
in face-to-face retail sales. The chart could indicate the time rate on
a $120 purchase and the time rate on a $130 purchase. The buyer

)
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would then know the range of rates and could estimate what he
would be paying. In the above example, the range is between 18. 1
per cent and 15.7 per cent annual interest on the declining balance.
This range is not very wide and gives a reasonably accurate statement of time rate.
Even with the use of charts, however, time rate disclosure can be
given only if the particular transaction is an isolated one. For example, a customer buys an item selling for $127 cash. A finance charge
of $13 is added, and the total of $140 is made payable in fourteen
monthly payments of $10. The chart indicates that the rate is between 15.7 per cent and 18.1 per cent. Two months later the same
customer buys an item selling for $10.75 cash. A finance charge of
$1.25 is added, and according to the chart the total of $12 is payable
in four monthly payments of $3. The chart indicates that the rate
is between 42.6 per cent and 62.4 per cent. But, because it is inconvenient for both the customer and the store to have several individual contracts with different terms outstanding at the same time,
the two contracts are consolidated; the store informs the customer
that under the new contract he must pay $11 per month for twelve
months. The total, $132, is the total of the unpaid balance on the
first contract, $120, plus the amount of the second purchase, $12.
The term of the contract is the unexpired term of the longer contract. Thus the effective rate on the second purchase is not between
42.6 per cent and 62.4 per cent, but is actually 21.5 per centl
Where revolving credit is not used, such consolidation of time
sale contracts is common practice. It is of great benefit to the consumer, since he makes one payment instead of several without any
increase in his finance charge. However, as the above example shows,
the effective rate can change very substantially. The example also
points up the fact that the $1.25 is a service charge primarily designed to cover the cost of handling the transaction. The term over
'which the finance charge is payable greatly affects the time rate, but
the length of this term is determined fortuitously by the term of the
outstanding contract with the customer. Neither the 21.5 per cent or
the 42.6 per cent to 62.4 per cent figure is very significant; however,
the $1.25 figure is highly significant.
Whenever a purchase is to be consolidated with previous debts
owed by the customer, time rate disclosure by the salesman is not
feasible, since he needs information concerning the outstanding debt
which he normally will not have. Even if he had this information,
a salesman would not normally be expected to spend his time mak-
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ing the required calculations. A central record office ordinarily
would be consulted to provide the information. With respect to
large transactions, it might be economical to get the information for
the purpose of precontract disclosure, but it certainly is not economical in the case of small transactions. Of course, precontract
time rate disclosure would be impossible with respect to such transactions as mail order sales; the most that could be required, in such
a case would be that the purchaser be informed, after the contract
is in effect, of the effective rate.

IV.

TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH TIME RATE

DIScLosuRE

Is

DESIRABLE

Having examined the different functions of disclosure of finance
charges and the feasibility of making time rate disclosure in various
transactions, we shall relate function to feasibility and evaluate the
desirability of the various methods of finance charge disclosure. It is
our thesis that disclosure of :finance charges is not an end in itself;
rather, legal requirement of disclosure by any method must be justified on the ground that it performs some useful function. How
finance charges should be disclosed and in what transactions disclosure should be required are questions that must be solved by balancing the benefit to the consumer against the cost to the creditor.
There are three methods of disclosure: in terms of total dollar
amount of the finance charge, in terms of periodic dollar payment,
and the expression of the finance charge as a time rate. We believe
that, with the exception of very long-term debt, the consumer should
be told the total dollar cost of the credit in all transactions in which
such disclosure is possible.82 In most instances information about the
dollar amount best performs the descriptive function of finance
charge disclosure. Except in open-end credit transactions, such as revolving credit, it is feasible for the creditor to supply dollar disclosure at the inception of the transaction. In open-end credit, periodic
disclosure of dollar amount of finance charges can be made after
debts are incurred. Disclosure of the amount and number of periodic
payments has long been regarded as a minimal standard with respect
to consumer credit transactions and should be required in every situation in which it is feasible.
The remaining question concerns the desirability of time rate
disclosure. In the section on feasibility it was concluded that it is not
possible for a creditor to make time rate disclosure in open-end
32. Such a requirement is contained in § 4 of the Douglas Bill, S. 2275.
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credit transactions.83 It was also concluded that in closed-end credit
transactions it is possible for a creditor to give time rate disclosure
whenever the amount of the credit, the amount of the finance charge,
and the time and amount of the payments are known. Furthermore,
by use of charts it is feasible to make time rate disclosure in all
closed-end credit transactions except small retail sales if (1) an approximation rather than an exact rate is acceptable, and (2) the contract is a reasonably regular one. In small retail transactions, however, the feasibility of disclosing finance charges by time rate is
questionable. As was suggested in the previous section, in cases involving small, odd-dollar retail sales, time rate disclosure can, as a
practical matter, be given only in terms of a range of time rates covering a spread of different dollar amounts. Disclosure of rate by
range of dollar amounts gives a reasonably accurate approximation
of how much is being charged if the transaction is an isolated one.
Ordinary sales clerks could be trained to use the necessary charts,
which appear to be no more difficult to use than a sales tax chart.
However, if the transaction is not isolated but is to be consolidated
with existing debt, meaningful time rate disclosure cannot economically be made before the contract is signed. It is pointless to require
disclosure of a rate that may not bear any relation to the true rate.
Furthermore, to require the calculations necessary to arrive at a reasonably accurate rate in a non-isolated small transaction would impose inconvenience and serious economic cost upon both seller and
buyer. To appraise fully whether imposition of these additional economic costs is justified, the question whether time rate disclosure
serves a significant purpose in small transactions should be considered.
In the section on the function of disclosure of finance charges,
it was concluded that time rate disclosure does indeed further the
major function, that is, credit shopping. Our analysis leads to the
conclusion that in those transactions in which shopping for credit
as such is possible, such as auto sales, time rate disclosure contributes
33. The current version of the Douglas Bill, S. 2275, requires time rate disclosure in
open-end credit transactions. Section 4(b) provides that in open-end credit transactions
the creditor shall "(I) Furnish to such person, prior to agreeing to extend credit under
such plan, a clear statement in writing setting forth the simple annual percentage rate
or rates at which a finance charge will be imposed on the monthly balance; and
(2) furnish to such person, at the end of each monthly period ••• a clear statement in
writing setting forth to the extent applicable and ascertainable ••• the simple annual
percentage rate or rates at which a finance charge has been imposed on the monthly
balance." The September 25, 1964, Committee Print of S. 750 included amendments to
the original version of the bill that abrogated the requirement of time rate disclosure
in open-end credit transactions. In deleting these r.mendments, Senator Douglas in
S. 2275 has gone back to his original across-the-board requirement of annual percentage
disclosure.
•
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to improving the consumer's ability to shop more wisely. Not only
does time rate disclosure allow the credit shopper to compare the
rates of the different major segments of the finance industry (banks,
credit unions, sales finance companies, small loan companies, and
retailers), but also allows him to evaluate more accurately which
companies within the different institutional segments offer the most
attractive deal. We believe that credit shopping is possible with respect to virtually all sizes of loan transactions and with respect to
large retail sales.
,
In the smaller retail sales, we doubt that time rate disclosure
serves any beneficial function for the consumer; in such transactions
it might even be detrimental to consumers. It was indicated in a
previous section that the likelihood of consumers shopping for credit
. as such in small retail transactions is questionable. A purchaser buying a $30 bicycle on credit is more likely to compare the total dollar
cost of the transaction, such as $35, with that offered by competing
retailers than he is to consider whether he could borrow the $30
more cheaply at a bank or small loan company. Such an approach is
reasonable, for another retailer may be offering a comparable bicycle for $27 with a $6 :finance charge. In the small retail sale, the
buyer is understandably more interested in shopping with respect
to variation in the quality and price of the goods than he is with
respect to the amount of the :finance charge imposed.
In fact, there is some danger in encouraging consumers to overemphasize the finance charge element of the total credit price of
goods in retail sales. The allocation by a credit seller of the total
credit price of goods between cash price and finance charge can be
quite arbitrary, particularly if credit sales make up a large part of
the seller's business. The bicycle seller can price the article at $30
with a $5 finance charge, or he can "bury" the :finance charge in the
cash price and. quote a $33 cash price and a $2 :finance charge. In
the second case, the credit seller can quote the buyer a dramatically
lower time rate than in the first case. If retail consumers are taught
to seek out the lowest time rate, sellers will be encouraged to compete on what may be a completely arbitrary and meaningless basisthe amount and time rate of the finance charge. To the extent that
retailers compete by burying the finance charge in the cash price,
the cash consumer must subsidize the credit consumer.
Another factor pointing to the futility of requiring time rate
disclosure in small retail transactions is the limited number of cases
in which accurate rates could be given. We have discussed the difficulties caused by consolidated contracts. Moreover, there has been a
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sharp increase in the use of open-end credit in the small sales area.
A department store may sell a $30 chair on the traditional titleretention contract, or it may add the sale to the buyer's revolving
credit account; the store will base its choice as between the two meth•
ods upon such factors as the desire of the buyer, the total amount
financed, the amount of the monthly payments, and the nature of
the goods. We have postulated that there is no method of making
accurate time rate disclosure of finance charges in revolving credit
transactions. In fact, even dollar amount disclosure cannot be made
on a precontract basis. Hence, time rate disclosure in closed-end
credit situations gives the buyer little assistance in comparing these
finance costs with those in open-end credit situations. It is somewhat
ironical that over the decade in which the controversy over the Doug•
las Bill has raged, the actual importance of percentage disclosure has
probably diminished because of the strong trend toward revolving
credit. It is almost inevitable that credit cards, a form of revolving
credit, will become the standard method of financing all but larger
credit purchases. As the revolving credit volume continues to expand
in retail sales at the expense of closed-end credit, time rate disclosure in the latter becomes less useful for credit shopping purposes.
Any disclosure requirements which make the use of closed-end credit
more onerous to the retailer will simply accelerate the trend toward
revolving credit.
There are other arguments against requiring time rate disclosure
in these transactions. In small balance, short term credit transactions, whether sale or loan, the finance charge must necessarily contain a large service charge component. It costs almost as much to
process and service a $50 credit extension as a $500 one. Hence, for
the creditor to deal in small credit transactions at a profit, he must
charge nearly as much for giving the $50 credit as the larger one.
This results in comparatively high finance charge rates on small
sales and loans. La·wmakers have recognized this economic fact by
allowing sellers to impose minimum finance charges on retail sales
and by prescribing graduated rate ceilings on both sale and loan
credit charges.34 The question we pose is whether quoting to a consumer a very high time rate in small credit transactions materially
assists in his credit shopping.
Suppose a buyer purchases a $20 fan in a state which allows the
34. See CURRAN 270-77 (chart 13), indicating that in "all goods" retail installment
sale statutes, finance charge minima run from $5 to $20, with several statutes allowing
$10 to $12 charges.
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seller to impose a $10 minimum charge in all credit sales of goods.sis
If the contract called for repayment of the balance of $30 in weekly
payments of one dollar, the time rate calculated by the constant
ratio method would be 168 per cent per annum. In setting the minimum charge, the state legislature recognized that it costs the seller
at least $10 to sell any item on installment credit. Yet when this
charge is expressed as a time rate, the buyer will conclude that
he is being outrageously overcharged. The customer's reaction is
probably due to the fact that time rates have traditionally been
used to describe the cost of money, and consumers compare any
time rate with the cost of money in other familiar transactions,
such as real estate loans or savings deposits (the "six per cent myth").
A time rate is not a good way to describe the price of services; here
dollar amounts are traditional. Thus in cases in which the finance
charge is made up mostly of service charges, time rate disclosure
becomes largely meaningless. The service charge distortion is also
present in small loan transactions, but since the commercial small
loan is rarely under $100 and is usually much higher than that, this
service charge problem is not as great in such transactions.
It is significant that in larger transactions a creditor will have
a "rate of the house"; for example, he may finance all new car sales
at six dollars per hundred per annum. He will often advertise this
rate and will work from this rate to determine the finance charge
in each case. On the other hand, in t.qe small retail sale situation,
the seller will decide how much it costs him to make a credit sale
at a given price level, and he will then set a finance charge in dollars
to cover this cost. Dollar disclosure alone more clearly describes the
amount of the charge.
Some might say that time rate disclosure is most important with
respect to the small transaction in which the time rate would be
high, on the theory that one function of disclosure is to shock the
consumer into realizing how much he must pay for credit. They
would argue that if people realized how much credit . costs they
would use it less frequently, and therefore overcommitment would
become a smaller problem for credit consumers. Even assuming that
the desired effect is obtainable, this view seems indefensible if the
shock results from misleading figures. Moreover, if the Government
wishes to contract consumer credit, there are more direct methods
of doing so; the "Regulation W" approach of increasing low pay35. California, for example, would allow a $10 minimum charge in this case, so long
as the term of the credit is less than eight months. If the term were more than eight
months, $12 would be the highest permissible minimum charge. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1.
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ment requirements and shortening maturities is the best example.86
Furthermore, it is doubtful that time rate disclosure, even in the
small transactions in which rates would appear to be very large,
would have any lasting effect in reducing credit extensions. In the
very month in which manufacturers first printed the legend "Caution: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health" on cigarette packages there was an increase in cigarette consumption in
the United States.37
Our conclusion is that there should be no requirement of time
rate disclosure in open-end credit or small retail sales transactions.
It has been shown that time rate disclosure is impossible in openend credit situations, and there are serious questions both as to the
economic cost of requiring time rate disclosure and the desirability
of doing so with respect to small retail sales. It is difficult to draw
a line bet\veen large and small transactions. The division must necessarily depend on somewhat arbitrary assumptions concerning the
level at which credit shopping is potentially effective. A figure in
the range of $200 to $300 is probably defensible. 38 No doubt there
is some degree of credit shopping going on amongst all but the most
necessitous borrowers in the loan credit area. Time rate disclosure
to the necessitous borrower is a neutral factor; he is neither helped
nor harmed by it. Presumably the ease of giving time rate disclosure in the small loan transaction is greater than in the small retail
sale. In all other areas of consumer credit, time rate disclosure would
give the consumer benefits that would at least justify the cost to
creditors of supplying the additional information. Such disclosure
should be given before the consumer enters into the credit transaction if precontract disclosure is at all feasible. It should be recognized, however, that in some areas, such as catalogue selling and
the consolidation of retail contracts, only post-contract disclosure
may be possible. To the extent that retailers rely on repeat business
or continuing relationships with customers, post-contract disclosure
may be effective.
36. Regulation W was imposed during wartime by the federal government to control
the volume of consumer credit. See MoRS 46.
37. Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1966, pt. I, p. 18, col. 3.
38. A useful starting point for fixing the dividing line between large and small
transactions might be the level at which the general ceiling rate rather than minimum
charges sets the finance charge ceiling. For example, the California Retail Installment
Sales Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1, provides for an add-on rate of ten dollars per
hundred per year (% of 1% per $100 per month) for credits of $1,000 or less. The
minimum charges are $10 for a contract of 8 months or less and $12 for contracts of
over 8 months. For contracts of just over 8 months, the general ceiling rate of ten
dollars per hundred will apply for credits of $180 and more.

May 1966]

Disclosure of Finance Charges

1319

If time rate disclosure is to be required in many common credit
transactions, the question arises whether it should be stated in terms
of an annual percentage rate (as the Douglas Bill requires), a
monthly percentage rate, or as dollars per hundred per year. Any of
the three methods would be adequate to afford the consumer a.
method of comparing credit costs. A sociologist recently concluded:

There has been considerable dispute on the "best" way of
formulating the costs of consumer credit, and it has been thought
that some psychological experiment might help solve the problem. To some extent this is true, but on reflection, the main
problems must lie elsewhere. The competing formulations are
not too different and the trouble is not so much that each could
be better, but that there are so many different ones abroad. If
there were only one formula, no matter which one were chosen
-although one should strive for the best one-there would be
no problem. As time went on, everybody who cared could understand its meaning. Thus, standardization more than choice of a
"best" formula might be the most valuable contribution.39
Our preference would be for an annual time rate, but, as between dollars per hundred and annual interest, we see little basis
for choice.40 Dollars per hundred is the common method of computing and advertising finance charges in the whole range- of retail
credit transactions. There is no uniform method used in loan credit
contracts. However, credit life insurance and credit accident and
health insurance rates are commonly stated in terms of dollars per
hundred. Thus if finance charges were stated in terms of dollars per
hundred, credit insurance charges could be similarly stated on the
contract, allowing the consumer to see the relationship between the
two; he could learn the total cost of credit expressed as a time rate
by merely adding the two figures together. For example, if the
finance charge is expressed as eight dollars per hundred per year and
the credit insurance charge is expressed as two dollars per hundred
per year, the consumer can add the two amounts to obtain the time
rate of ten dollars per hundred per year. On the other hand, it can
be said that the time rate should be expressed in terms of annual
interest because this method would allow the consumer to make a
39. Memorandum prepared by Professor Hans Zeise!, of the University of Chicago
School of Law, for the use of the Consumer Credit Project of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
40. It is here assumed that a workable definition of "finance charges" can be drafted.
It should be noted in passing that § 3(3) of the Douglas Bill has been severely criticized
for its vague, all-encompassing definition of finance charge. See Hearings on S. 2275
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1063 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Walter D. Malcolm).
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more meaningful comparison between the return to him on his
savings and the cost of consumer credit. This would help the consumer who has savings to decide whether to use credit or to wjthdraw his savings and pay cash, but the number of people who look
. to savings as an alternative source for financing consumer purchases
is probably very limited.
V.

DISCLOSURE IN CONTEXT

It has often been observed that one of the principal social evils
in consumer credit is the financial overcommitment to which many
consumers are led. The man who is burdened with debts and
hounded by creditors presents a substantial social problem. The
hearings on the Douglas Bill indicate that the problem is widespread.
However, it is extremely doubtful that time rate disclosure of finance
charges represents a significant answer to the problem.
The concept of time rate disclosure is in the mainstream of
previous legislative approaches to the problems of the consumer.
Existing statutes in many cases closely regulate the content of the
contract between creditor and consumer. Under these statutes
the consumer is typically given very detailed information about the
transaction: he is warned in large type to read the contract before
he signs; he is advised not to sign if the contract has blank spaces;
and he is told what legal rights he possesses in a wide variety of situations in which he might find himself. Still he is frequently cheated.
The simple truth is that for a very large percentage of consumers,
contract disclosure is meaningless. Selling is not normally done in
the contract. The consumer is sold before he ever signs the contract
and he seldom reads it before or after he signs. This is not an argument against either time rate disclosure or existing state disclosure
statutes; disclosure legislation can be very useful to some consumers
-those who read contracts-and it may even be of some value to
those who do not read them. If high rate creditors are forced to disclose their charges in a graphic way it is more likely that their practices will become generally known. However, it is well to point out
that whatever the benefits of disclosure may be, other action might
be of much greater significance in helping the consumer. We are fearful that in the great emphasis which many have placed upon time
rate disclosure, the limitations on disclosure as a protective device
have been overlooked.
Disclosure statutes follow the traditional pattern; they constitute
an attempt to equalize the struggle between consumer and creditor
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by giving the consumer certain weapons. The theory is that if the
consumer is given all relevant information and an array of legal
rights he can then do battle with the creditor. This approach simply
has not worked in many cases.
Our experience indicates that the principal victim of the deficiencies in the consumer credit system is the person who gets too far
into debt, who receives poor quality goods or services, or who pays
too much for the product he receives. All too often all three elements
are present at the same time when the buyer becomes involved with
a disreputable seller. Typically the victim is unsophisticated, uneducated, and foolish. He is often the person who is least able to benefit
from detailed disclosure provisions. His problem is not one of credit
charges but rather of credit itself. The use of credit makes it possible
for someone to sell him goods and services which he would never
buy for cash. Rarely is he cheated because he is overcharged for the
credit itself; indeed, he often buys from a merchant who makes "no
charge for credit."
If the marginal consumer cannot be relied upon to avoid bad
bargains, a more fruitful approach may be to take away from the
creditor some of the weapons that make it possible for him to profit
at the expense of the unwary. Frequently an unscrupulous merchant
will sell shoddy goods which are greatly overpriced. Normally title
is retained by the seller. If the buyer misses a payment or wants to
withhold a payment because the goods are unsatisfactory, he is faced
with the threat of repossession. If the creditor repossesses he may sell
the goods, perhaps to himself, at a small fraction of their original
price. He may then get a judgment against the original buyer for the
unpaid purchase price plus the expenses of the repossession and his
attorney's fee. To collect his judgment the creditor may then garnish .
the buyer's wages, and an employee whose wages are garnished frequently loses his job. The buyer faced with the prospect of losing
what he has already paid on the goods, the goods. themselves, and perhaps his job, is more likely to pay the creditor even if it is an unjust
debt and even if payment means sacrifice of necessaries for his family.
Furthermore, the unavailability of legal assistance in cases of this
kind leaves the buyer with many rights that go unvindicated.
Creditors have many weapons available to them for bringing
debtors to heel, and courts of law serve as inexpensive and efficient
collection agencies. Thus the unscrupulous may find it profitable to
sell to the consumer who cannot afford to pay. However, if some of
these weapons are taken from the creditor he may be encouraged to
ration credit. For example, if the creditor is not allowed to get a de-
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:ficiency judgment or, what is more important, if he is not allowed
to garnish the wages of someone earning no more than a living wage,
it is more difficult for him to victimize the buyer. He will have to
rely upon larger do-wn payments and upon collateral to secure the
unpaid balance.
It is frequently the case that victimization of consumers is done
by creditors who make a regular practice of illegal or unconscionable
behavior, relying upon the default judgment, and the inability of
some consumers to assert legal rights, in order to maintain their
operations. By means of effective administrative remedies designed
to force creditors to desist from such practices, many of the more
outrageous credit practices could be stopped.
The disclosure of :finance charges on a rational basis is an important element of consumer protection, and we have sought to give a
balanced analysis of the function which it can serve. However, we
would like to close with the observation that little may be gained
from disclosure legislation unless it is coupled with effective provisions for protection of the consumer in the area of creditors' remedies and effective policing by public officials of unconscionable creditor practices.

